Impossible antecedents and their consequences: some thirteenth-century Arabic discussions
The principle that a necessarily false proposition implies any proposition, and that a necessarily true proposition is implied by any proposition, was apparently first propounded in twelfth century Latin logic, and came to be widely, though not universally, accepted in the fourteenth century. 1 These principles seem never to have been accepted, or even seriously entertained, by Arabic logicians. In the present paper I explore some thirteenth century Arabic discussions of conditionals with impossible antecedents. Some logicians of the period suggested the novel idea that two contradictory propositions may follow from the same impossible antecedent, and closely related to this point, they suggested that if an antecedent implied a consequent, then it would do so no matter how it was strengthened. These ideas led them to reject what has come to be known as 'Aristotle's thesis' that nothing is implied by its own negation. Even these suggestions were, as we shall see, widely resisted.
1 See Martin 1987; Martin 1986 The reductio proof Avicenna offered for this view is as follows: Assume that (1) is true and (2) is false. Then the contradictory of (2) is true: (3) Once (Qad yakun): If A is B then Not Every J is D But (1) and (3) cannot both be true since this would mean that, assuming the antecedent 'Every A is B', it is at least once the case that 'Not Every J is D' even though, by (1), 'Every J is D' is always true when 'Every A is B' is true. This is absurd. 3 That something follows from something does not imply that its contradictory does not also follow from that thing, for a contradictory pair may follow from the same impossible antecedent. Is a reductio syllogism anything but a contradictory pair both following from the contradictory of the proposed conclusion? The contradictories of most claims in geometry, and for that matter in logic itself, imply both something and its contradictory. Scholarly works are full of proofs that show that a contradictory pair follows from the contradiction of a claim. This is not something obscure so that one needs to expand further. 7 Najm al-Dīn al- Kātibī (d.1277) , in his commentary on Khūnajī's work, did expand further. 8 He explicated Khūnajī's claim as follows: Suppose we wish to prove the following valid inference in the second- figure: (1) Every J is B
(2) No A is B
7
We then add the contradictory of the proposed conclusion to the two premises, and thus get an argument consisting of three premises. Premises (2) and (4) jointly imply (by FERIO):
(5) Some J is not B But premise (1), viz. 'Every J is B', implies itself.
(6) Every J is B
The three inconsistent premises (1) (2) and (4) together thus imply both 'Some J is not B' and 'Every J is B'.
For Khūnajī and his commentator Kātibī it was apparently too obvious to mention that by showing that an inconsistent set of premises implied both a proposition and its contradictory, they had also shown that the conditional having the premises as antecedent and the contradictory conclusions as consequent was true. Medieval Arabic logicians in the Avicennist tradition -a tradition which had achieved a position of predominance by the thirteenth century and which includes all the logicians discussed here -distinguished between 'coincidental' (ittifāqī) and 'implicative' (luzūmī) conditionals. The former were sometimes presented as being truth-functional, but then in the sense of being true if and only if both antecedent and consequent were true, or alternatively if and only if the consequent was true. The latter, which were clearly much more interesting to medieval Arabic logicians, were generally understood to involve a necessary connection -causal or conceptualbetween the antecedent and the consequent. Hence it could be false even if both antecedent and consequent were true. The necessary falsity of the antecedent was not sufficient for the truth of the conditional.
The same term, luzūm (which I translate as 'implication'), was used to denote both the relation between antecedent and consequent in a true 'implicative'
conditional, and the relation between premises and conclusion in a valid argument. In other contexts, Arabic logicians did make the expected distinction between luzūm by virtue of form and luzūm by virtue of matter, and there is nothing to suggest that they failed to recognise that in the standard example of an 'implicative' conditional -'If the sun is up then it is day' -the antecedent does not formally imply the consequent.
However, they obviously did not think that it was always important to mark the distinction. Thus the antecedent in a true implicative conditional was said simply to 'imply' the consequent and the consequent to 'be implied by' the antecedent.
Likewise, the premises in a valid argument was said to 'imply' the conclusion and the conclusion to be 'implied' by the premises. In what follows, I will follow the sources in using the term 'implication' in this broad sense, and not merely to denote formal implication.
As mentioned above, two modal operators -'Always' and 'Once' -were prefixed to the conditionals. These were explicitly taken to correspond to the universal and particular quantifier in categorical propositions: a 'universal' conditional would hence look like this: 11 Matters are a bit more complicated than this, since Avicenna drew a distinction between a conditional being true in fact (fī nafs al-amr) and its being supposed true for purposes of forcing a conclusion on an opponent in debate (bi'l-ilzām). For example: the conditional 'If 5 is even then it is a number' is true for purposes of argument, in the sense that someone who accepts the antecedent '5 is even' and the suppressed premise 'Everything that is even is a number', must accept the conclusion. It is false in fact because the antecedent and the suppressed premise are actually incompatible (since the even 5 is not a number, and no number is an even 5). Avicenna seems to have held that an affirmative conditional is only true fī nafs alamr if it can be reformulated as a true affirmative categorical proposition:
If our statement 'If five is even then it is a number' were true and should be conceded in itself, then it would be true to say 'What is an even five is a number'. Since this is false, then the conditional that is equipollent to it must be false too. And if this categorical proposition [i.e. 'What is an even five is a number'] were true, then its converse -that some number is an even fivewould be true. 12
The upshot of the distinction seems to be the following: The antecedent of a universal affirmative conditional that is true in fact must be at least possible. In this case, the objection that one may strengthen the antecedent with a proposition that is incompatible with the consequent cannot arise. For example, it cannot be objected to the universal truth of 'If 4 is even then it is a number' that one may strengthen the antecedent with the proposition '4 is not a number', in which case the consequent would not follow in all situations in which the antecedent is true. For the purported counter-example -and any other such counter-example -is false since it has an impossible antecedent. By contrast, a conditional that is true for the purpose of argument may have an impossible antecedent. To avoid the position that no universal conditional is true for the purpose of argument, since we can always strengthen the antecedent with a proposition that is not compatible with the consequent, we need to stipulate that the proposition used to strengthen the antecedent is compatible with it. 13 Khūnajī seems to have ignored this distinction between a conditional being true in fact and for the purposes of argument, and he expressed reservations about Avicenna's proposed amendment. The impossible situation in which 'this is human'
12 Ibn Sīnā, 1037a, 240. 13 The distinction between truth fī nafs al-amr and bi'l-ilzām is introduced in Ibn Sīnā 1037a, 239-241. It is brought to bear on the problem of strengthening antecedents with propositions that are incompatible with the consequent in ibid, 273-275. and 'this is not an animal' are both true is not a situation in which it does not follow that 'this is an animal' is true. The impossible antecedent 'this is human & this is not an animal' implies both the consequent 'this is an animal' and its contradictory 'this is not an animal'. As his commentator Kātibī put it:
We do not concede that if we assume the antecedent with the non-existence of the consequent then the consequent does not follow but instead the nonexistence of the consequent follows, nor that this [viz. that the non-existence of the consequent follows] necessitates the non-following of the consequent that is opposed to the affirmative implicative conditional. It is possible that both of a contradictory pair follow from an impossible antecedent. 14 Similarly with the particular conditional: Such a conditional is true if the antecedent (formally or materially) implies the consequent when strengthened with another proposition. But unless we stipulate that the additional proposition must be compatible with the original antecedent, it would seem that any proposition will partially imply any other proposition, and that no universal-negative implicative conditional could be true. Khūnajī and Kātibī were -as we will see -willing to accept this conclusion.
Another ramification of Khūnajī's argument becomes apparent in the If A is B then J is not D'. However, (1) and (3) In the first premise it is the first conjunct of the antecedent (this is a human) that alone implies the consequent, and the second conjunct (this is a horse) is irrelevant to the obtaining of the consequent. Similarly, in the second premise it is the second conjunct of the antecedent (this is a horse) alone that implies the consequent, and the first conjunct (this is a human) is irrelevant. The fact that a middle term is mentioned (yatakarrar lafẓan) is misleading. On the level of 'meanings' or 'intentions'
(maʿānī) there is no middle term. 21 The diagnosis does not itself reveal whether Ṭūṣī believed that the premises of the hypothetical syllogism are false or whether they are true but do not 'really' have a middle term. The following analogy that he drew with categorical syllogisms clearly shows that he believed the premises to be false: By the same token, he argued, one should be able to construct the following categorical syllogism in the third figure:
Every human and horse is a human Every human and horse is a horse Some humans are horses
The conclusion is clearly false, and since Ṭūṣī explicitly stated that the syllogism was formally valid, he must have held the premises to be false. His diagnosis of the problem is analogous to the case of the troublesome hypothetical syllogism: in the first premise, it is the first conjunct of the subject-term (human) that calls for an affirmative relation to the predicate, and in the second premise it is the second conjunct (horse). There is no middle term except in utterance.
Ṭūṣī's analogy with a categorical syllogism in the third-figure seems, at least at first sight, to overlook a significant difference between categorical and conditional propositions. It was generally agreed that affirmative categorical propositions have existential import, and hence are not true if the subject does not exist, actually or possibly. Kātibī mentioned precisely the same third-figure categorical syllogism, and he too believed the syllogism to be formally valid and the conclusion false. His diagnosis of the problem with the premises, however, was different and arguably more straightforward: they are both false since there is nothing corresponding to the subject-terms. 22 By contrast, it was generally accepted that conditionals could be true even if their antecedent was impossible. Ṭūṣī, however, argued that impossible antecedents should, strictly speaking, be treated analogously to impossible subjects.
Strictly speaking, nothing follows from impossible antecedents, just as nothing can be predicated of impossible subjects.
The impossible (al-muḥāl) insofar as it is impossible, and even the non-existent insofar as it is non-existent, cannot be judged to imply something, but can be judged not to imply something. Just as the subject, insofar as it does not exist, cannot be the subject of an affirmative judgement, but all things can be negated of it. 23
Ṭūṣī's position is more flexible than this quotation suggests, since he accepted Avicenna's distinction between conditionals being true de facto and being true for the purposes of argument. A conditional cannot be true de facto if it has an impossible antecedent, but it may still be true for the purposes of argument. His diagnosis is meant to disarm the conclusion when the premises are taken as true in the latter sense.
Ṭūṣī was also dismissive of attempts to question Avicenna's principle that an Ṭūṣī thus argued that if Abharī were right, and 'If P then not-Q' and 'If P then Q' could both be true, then there would not be such a thing as universal (kullī) implication, and any conditional of the form 'Always: if P then Q' would be false.
IV
Ṭūṣī's rejection of the idea that an antecedent could imply both a proposition and its contradictory, and his diagnosis of what was wrong with the problematic third-figure hypothetical syllogism of Khūnajī, had a significant impact on the later logical tradition.
On the first of these points: it seems to have been because of criticisms such as Ṭūṣī's that Abharī's student Kātibī, who is known to have corresponded with Ṭūṣī on philosophical and logical matters, presented a somewhat modified account of Khūnajī's and Abharī's position. 26 In his commentary on Khūnajī's Kashf al-asrār, Kātibī held that Khūnajī's criticism of Avicenna overlooked Avicenna's distinction between a conditional being true in fact (fī nafs al-amr) and for the purpose of argument (bi'l-ilzām). He pointed out that it was specifically of conditionals being true in the second sense that Avicenna had insisted that the situations relevant to the truth of the universal conditional be those compatible with the antecedent. Unless we made this specification, accepting the antecedent would not commit someone to also accepting the consequent, and thus no universal conditional would be true bi'l-ilzām:
In other words, we shall not be able to force someone to concede its [the Kātibī agreed with Avicenna (and Ṭūṣī) on this point. He also agreed with Avicenna that this stipulation was not necessary in the case of universal conditionals that were of Abharī's. Katip Çelebi seems not to have been particularly well-informed on this point, and the date of death that he gives for Kātibī is obviously a guess and in fact two decades off the mark. true in fact. Such conditionals remain true regardless of how we strengthen the antecedent. The de facto truth of 'Always: If the sun is up then it is day' is not affected by situations that are incompatible with the antecedent (such as 'The sun is up and it is not day') that could be used to construct a counterexample to the original conditional ('Always: If the sun is up and it is not day then it is not day'). Avicenna defended this position by claiming that any such counter-example with 'strengthened' antecedent and contradictory consequent would be false, since the 'strengthened' antecedent was impossible, and any conditional with an impossible antecedent was de facto false. Kātibī's reason for rejecting such counterexamples was different -he may have wished to allow for conditionals that had an impossible antecedent but were nevertheless de facto true. Instead, he followed Khūnajī in maintaining that the conditionals with strengthened and impossible antecedents simply did not contradict the original conditional:
If someone were to falsify the truth of the universal conditional that is true in fact … as when someone says: 'It is not true that whenever the sun is up then it is day', and argues that if we take the sun being up with its not being day, or with it not following that it is day, then it does not follow that it is day -we deny that this [counter-] conditional is true. And if he claims that not being day follows it in such cases, then we concede this and deny that it contradicts our statement 'Always: if the sun is up then it is day'. All that we concede is that if both conditionals are true then its being day and its not being day both follow from the sun being up in some situations and according to some suppositions.
However, it is not known that this is impossible, since it is possible that these situations and suppositions are impossible, and it is not excluded that an impossibility implies another impossibility. 28 Why did Kātibī not use the same Khūnajī-inspired diagnosis for purported counterexamples to universal conditionals that are held to be true bi'l-ilzām? He seems to have reasoned as follows: A universal conditional that is true bi'l-ilzām is such that someone who accepts the antecedent must be able to see that she must also accept the consequent. Suppose we put forward such a universal conditional: 'Always: If P then Q'. A counter-example to the universal truth of such a conditional would be:
'Always: If P and not-Q then not-Q'. In this dialectic context, it would not do to concede that the counterexample is true but does not contradict the original conditional, for the counterexample does not contradict the original conditional only if the original conditional is universally true, and this is precisely the point at issue. By conceding the truth of the counterexample, we have cast doubt on the truth of the original universal conditional, and shall not be able to show that someone who accepts the antecedent must also accept the consequent.
If we claim that it is true that 'Always: if a number is two then it is even' without adding the condition that the situations and conditions that are supposed to obtain be compatible with it but rather unconditionally … and it is said [in We do not concede that the two premises are true. They would be true if each part of the antecedent were relevant to the obtaining of the implication (dakhl fī iqtiḍāʾ al-luzūm). It is clear that humanity has nothing to with the implication of non-humanity, nor has non-humanity anything to do with the implication of humanity. Yes, this would be true with respect to what one is forced to concede proposition. Khūnajī's paradoxical third-figure hypothetical syllogism is phrased in a manner that does not explicitly challenge the assumption that there must be some relevance between premises and conclusion or between antecedent and consequent in an implicative conditional. Yet even the principle of 'simplification' that he used (i.e.
inferring either conjunct from a conjunction), and the principle of 'monotonicity' that he defended (i.e. that if premises implied a conclusion they would do so regardless of what propositions were added to the premises), were too much for many later Arabic logicians. Following Ṭūṣī, they rejected simplification and demanded that all conjuncts in the antecedent be relevant to the obtaining of the consequent -and that all premises in an argument be relevant to the conclusion -before they would concede that this constituted a true implicative conditional, or a valid inference.
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